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INTRODUCTION
The most recent King County One Night Count reported a staggering
11,643 unhoused individuals living on the streets of King County in early
2017,1 a 9% year-over-year increase from 2016.2 This rise occurred despite
King County Executive Dow Constantine and Seattle Mayor Ed Murray’s
declaration of local homelessness as a “state of emergency” in 2015. 3 This
critical declaration gave the municipalities access to emergency funding
to begin addressing the underlying issues contributing to the dramatic rise
in the unhoused population.4 A prominent segment of the unhoused
population is a group sometimes described as “hiding in plain sight”:
vehicle residents.5 While technically counted as unsheltered, vehicle
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1. ALL HOME, HOMELESSNESS IN KING COUNTY (2017) [hereinafter 2017 ONE NIGHT COUNT],
http://allhomekc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-Count-Us-In-Infographic.pdf.
2. ALL HOME, KING COUNTY ONE NIGHT COUNT SUMMARY OF 2016 DATA, http://allhomekc.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2016-KC-ONC-numbers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q527-LVMP]
(updated May 9, 2016).
3. Daniel Beekman and Jack Broom, Mayor, County Exec Declare ‘State of Emergency’ Over
Homelessness, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 31, 2016, 10:41 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/politics/mayor-county-exec-declare-state-of-emergency-over-homelessness/ [https://perma.cc/
Z4U5-NPSL] (“[L]ocal leaders Monday declared states of emergency in Seattle and King County.”).
4. Id.
5. Ashwin Warrior, Everyone Counts: Including Vehicle Residents Hiding in Plain Sight,
FIRESTEEL (Jan. 29, 2013), http://firesteelwa.org/2013/01/everyone-counts-including-vehicleresidents-hiding-in-plain-sight/ [https://perma.cc/AE5Q-PHLY].
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residents are able to utilize their vehicle as a primary means of shelter and,
unsurprisingly, make up a significant portion of the total unsheltered
population6—42% per the 2017 One Night Count Results.7
“Banishing vehicle residency is one of the fastest-growing forms of
criminalization.”8 In 2014, a nationwide survey by the National Law
Center on Homelessness and Poverty found that the number of cities with
ordinances that effectively criminalized vehicle habitation increased by
119% between 2011 and 2014.9 These ordinances take the form of metered
street parking zones,10 permit-only parking zones,11 time restrictions,12
restrictions on vehicle operability,13 restrictions regarding licensing and
registration,14 and even prohibitions directed specifically at vehicle
habitation.15 Violations of these policies typically result in noncriminal
citations imposing fees, requiring attendance at hearings, or inflicting
other financial burdens, which nevertheless can have devastating impacts
on someone with already limited resources.16 Additionally, the effects of
these typically noncriminal citations can be exacerbated by the
implementation of “scofflaw ordinances.” Scofflaw ordinances escalate
penalties and financial burdens by allowing for the extrajudicial
impoundment of the targeted vehicle for specific violations, such as
6. Heidi Groover, “My Van Was Just Gone.” Homeless Advocates Ask City to Stop Ticketing,
Towing Vehicles People Live In, THE STRANGER (Oct. 3, 2017, 4:27 PM), http://www.thestranger.
com/slog/2017/10/03/25450050/my-van-was-just-gone-homeless-advocates-ask-city-to-stopticketing-towing-vehicles-people-live-in [https://perma.cc/G7EA-37XX].
7. 2017 ONE NIGHT COUNT, supra note 1.
8. Jessica So et al., Living at the Intersection: Laws and Vehicle Residency, HOMELESS RIGHTS
ADVOCACY PROJECT 3 (Sara Rankin ed., May 2016) [hereinafter “Living at the Intersection”],
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2776423 [https://perma.cc/XFW5-G8BQ].
9. See NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 15 (Nov. 2011) [hereinafter “NATIONAL LAW
CENTER”], https://www.nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place [https://perma.cc/FU3X-TEEH].
10. E.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., LAND USE ORDINANCE § 86.0106 (2018); KIRKLAND, WASH.,
PARKING ORDINANCE § 12.45.230 (2018); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.76.015 (2018).
11. E.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., LAND USE ORDINANCE § 86.2014; SAN DIEGO, CAL., LAND USE
ORDINANCE § 86.0143 (2018); KIRKLAND, WASH., PARKING ORDINANCE § 12.45.240 (2018);
SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.14.515 (2018).
12. E.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., LAND USE ORDINANCE § 86.0118 (2018); KIRKLAND, WASH.,
PARKING ORDINANCE § 12.45.300 (2018); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.72.240 (2018);
SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.72.260 (2018); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.72.440
(2018).
13. E.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., LAND USE ORDINANCE § 86.0137 (2018); SANTA BARBARA, CAL.,
ZONING ORDINANCES § 30.175.030(M) (2018); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.92.010;
SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.92.020 (2018).
14. E.g., SANTA BARBARA, CAL., ZONING ORDINANCES § 30.175.030(M) (2018); KIRKLAND,
WASH., PARKING ORDINANCE § 12.45.170 (2018); SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 11.22.070
(2018); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.72.145 (2018).
15. E.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., LAND USE ORDINANCE § 86.0137 (2018).
16. Rianna Hidalgo, The Pile Up, REAL CHANGE (Aug. 5, 2015), http://realchangenews.org/
2015/08/05/pile [https://perma.cc/Q5J8-CKNN].
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accumulating a certain threshold of unpaid fines, or exceeding specified
time restrictions.17 These restrictions are typically justified by
municipalities as necessary to address public order or health and safety
concerns;18 however, the policies are also driven by pressure from
community members who fear that allowing overnight parking will invite
problems stereotypically associated with vehicle residents.19
In addition to being disproportionately impacted by these laws due
to limited financial resources, vehicle residents also have limited
alternative options. Most of the available public parking infrastructure is
restricted.20 And the alternatives that do exist are insufficient for the
demand.21 In other words, parking violations can lead to the government
pushing vehicle residents out of their vehicles—their homes—and onto the
street.22 Many of these ordinances require attendance at special hearings
to contest or mitigate the violations.23 The most harmful ones allow for the
conversion of unpaid, noncriminal violations into misdemeanors, having
the compounding effect of dragging vehicle residents into the criminal
justice system and exposing them to its subsequent financial burdens and
social penalties.24
Meanwhile, courts have been hesitant to wade into what is potentially
one of the “thorniest” of “political thickets,”25 given the complexity of
issues underlying the dramatic growth of the unhoused population and the
competing sociopolitical philosophies about how to best address those
17. Living at the Intersection, supra note 8.
18. NATIONAL LAW CENTER, supra note 9.
19. Rianna Hidalgo, Nowhere To Go, REAL CHANGE (Jul. 22, 2015), http://www.realchange
news.org/2015/07/22/nowhere-go [https://perma.cc/U4QL-D9KM] (“[W]hat is happening at large
when it comes to the nearly 800 people who live in their vehicles in Seattle . . . has all the elements:
parking regulations that offer limited options and lead to a concentrated area of vehicle residents;
visible poverty and safety concern that fuels neighborhood tensions until they reach a boiling point; []
law enforcement officials caught inbetween [sic] the rock-and-hard-place of trying to enforce rules
without harming vulnerable population . . . and public misperceptions about who the people truly are
who reside within the RVs, trucks and cars on the streets of Seattle.”).
20. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text.
21. See generally T. Ray Ivey & Jodilyn L. Gilleland, Hidden in Plain Sight: Finding Safe
Parking for Vehicle Residents, SEATTLE UNIV. HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT (Sara Rankin
ed., May 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3173221 [https://perma.cc/
KSK4-L5HW] (advocating for local governments or social service organizations to implement Safe
Parking Programs, which “utilize existing public- or privately-owned parking infrastructure to provide
vehicle residents with a safe, reliable, and legal place to park,” as part of a locality’s overall strategy
for addressing homelessness).
22. Groover, supra note 6.
23. Living at the Intersection, supra note 8.
24. Id.
25. Paraphrasing the general proposition announced by Justice Frankfurter in reasoning against
the justiciability of an issue arising in a legislative redistricting case because of the politically charged
implications. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (“Courts ought not to enter this
political thicket.”).
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issues. In terms of a constitutional right to housing, the Supreme Court has
stated that “the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every
social and economic ill . . . [and w]e are unable to perceive [] any
constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality.”26
Courts have routinely refused to recognize people experiencing
homelessness as a possible “suspect class” under equal protection
doctrine.27 And courts have stated that parking regulations on their own,
without otherwise “attempt[ing] to regulate any constitutionally protected
activity,” cannot be attacked as unconstitutional because “there is no
constitutional or statutory right to park one’s car wherever one wants.”28
In short, in the current judicial environment, one would not expect much
in the form of judicial activism on behalf of those impacted by the
overcriminalization of homelessness, especially not in the field of parking
regulation.
That said, two recent Ninth Circuit opinions indicate a possible shift
in the bench’s general reluctance to entertain judicial interventions on
behalf of homeless individuals.29 Because of those indications, actions
seeking other such novel interventions could be filed as potential test
cases. A case raising such a novel statutory claim, under Washington’s
Homestead Act, was recently rejected in Seattle Municipal Court;
however, that decision was subsequently overturned on appeal in King
County Superior Court.30 That action and the specific novel claim raised
will be introduced in Part II of this Note. Part III will explore two federal
cases that signal a possible shift away from the bench’s general hostility
toward judicial activism on issues of homelessness and homeless rights by
reaching limited constitutional interventions. Part IV will present a closer
26. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
27. See, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Homeless persons
are not a suspect class”); see also Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1269
n.36 (3d Cir. 1992) (homeless not a suspect class); D’Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877, 879 n.2
(11th Cir. 1995) (homeless not a suspect class); Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 859
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (declining to be the first court to recognize fundamental right to sleep), dismissed,
87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 355 (N.D. Tex. 1994)
(homeless not a suspect class), rev’d on other grounds, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995); Davison v. City
of Tucson, 924 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D. Ariz. 1996) (homeless not a suspect class); State of Hawaii v.
Sturch, 921 P.2d 1170, 1176 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that there is “no authority supporting a
specific constitutional right to sleep in a public place” unless it is expressive conduct within the ambit
of the First Amendment or is protected by other fundamental rights). But see Pottinger v. City of
Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1578 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (indicating in dicta that homeless might constitute a
suspect class), remanded for limited purposes, 40 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 1994).
28. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Vill. of Orland Park, 139 F.
Supp. 2d 950, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
29. See infra Part III.
30. Amended Decision and Order on RALJ Appeal at 26, City of Seattle v. Long, No. 17-215099-1 SEA (King Cty. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2018).
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examination of Washington’s Homestead Act from both a textual
interpretation and historical perspective to determine how amenable it
might be as a path for judicial intervention. Part V will conclude by
describing why Washington State courts should heed the signals of the
Ninth Circuit and apply similar interventionist reasoning as the superior
court in the Seattle test case when interpreting the Homestead Act.
I. THE NOVEL STATUTORY CLAIM: HOMESTEAD ACT TEST CASE
Mr. Steven Long is a long-time Seattle resident. He, like so many
others, has found himself surviving without a permanent home since
2014.31 Since then, he has depended on his truck as his primary means of
shelter.32 For all intents and purposes, Mr. Long’s truck is his home.
In the summer of 2016, Mr. Long had to find a new location to park
his truck, which was experiencing mechanical issues—a common concern
for vehicle residents attempting to survive while maintaining the few
resources they possess. Mr. Long landed in a spot that he hoped was
perfect; a spot that was out-of-the-way, unmarked, and unobtrusive.33 He
even sought permission from the nearest local business owner.34 For three
months, Mr. Long enjoyed a fleeting sense of stability.35
Inevitably, Mr. Long’s luck ran out. Later that year, the Seattle Police
Department, responding to an unrelated call in the area, were made aware
of Mr. Long’s presence and cited him for violating Seattle’s ordinance
prohibiting a vehicle from occupying a public parking spot for more than
seventy-two hours.36 As a result, Mr. Long’s truck was impounded.37 With
the assistance of a local legal aid and advocacy organization, Mr. Long
challenged the impoundment of his vehicle under several constitutional
and statutory theories.
Although none of Mr. Long’s claims found success at the municipal
court level,38 he successfully appealed the denial of his motion for
summary judgment in King County Superior Court, which resulted in a
critical win for vehicle residents.39 Among his claims, Mr. Long advocated
31. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement at 1–2, City of Seattle v. Long, No. 203641306
(Seattle Mun. Ct. Mar. 13, 2017).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2.
34. Id. at 2–3.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id. at 3–4.
37. Id.
38. Order on Defense Motion for Summary Judgement at 3, City of Seattle v. Long, No.
203641306 (Seattle Mun. Ct. May 10, 2017).
39. Laurel Wamsley, A Homeless Man’s Truck Is His Home, Judge Rules In Seattle, NPR: THE
TWO-WAY (Mar. 6, 2018, 6:54 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/06/
591300547/a-homeless-mans-truck-is-his-home-judge-rules-in-seattle.
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for a novel intervention by the Washington State courts on behalf of
similarly situated vehicle residents. He sought and appears to have
received a holding that will allow future vehicle residents to invoke
Washington State’s Homestead Act as an affirmative protection barring,
at least, enforcement of the specific Seattle ordinance Mr. Long was said
to have violated,40 and potentially any other ordinance that would allow
for extrajudicial impoundment of a known vehicle resident’s vehicle.41
The City of Seattle intends to appeal the superior court’s decision.42
This Note will argue that the relief that Mr. Long won on appeal and
the interpretation of the Homestead Act announced by that court—
allowing for homestead exemption status to attach to a vehicle
immediately upon its occupation as a primary means of residence by an
otherwise unhoused individual43—is an entirely appropriate form of
judicial intervention. Homestead status would bar enforcement authorities,
such as the Seattle Police Department, from utilizing the impoundment
mechanisms otherwise authorized by Chapter 46.55 of the Revised Code
of Washington (RCW) (for reasons explored more fully in Part IV) against
a known vehicle resident’s vehicle. Such a holding (especially in a court
with a broader jurisdictional scope than King County Superior Court)
could be criticized as a blatant act of judicial activism departing from the
greater jurisprudential climate that cautions against such intervention on
issues of homelessness and homeless rights.44 It is to this generally
inhospitable jurisprudential environment where we turn next.
II. RECENT EXAMPLES OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTIONS
Before exploring why Washington’s Homestead Act is especially
suited for judicial intervention on behalf of vehicle residents, this section
will highlight two recent Ninth Circuit opinions that indicate a shift in the
bench’s general hostility toward judicial interventions on behalf of
homeless individuals.
A. Jones v. City of Los Angeles
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Jones v. City of Los Angeles is a
relatively early example of the court signaling to “local governments [that
40 Amended Decision, supra note 30, at 26.
41. See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.55 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.).
42. Vianna Davila, Seattle Will Appeal Ruling that Man Living Inside His Truck Should Not
Have Had to Pay High Fines After Vehicle was Towed, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018, 8:40 PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/homeless/city-of-seattle-appeals-ruling-that-a-truck-is-ahome/ (updated Mar. 8, 2018, 7:28 PM).
43. Amended Decision, supra note 30, at 26.
44. Davila, supra note 42 (quoting Deputy Seattle City Attorney John Schochet calling the ruling
“legally wrong and unworkable”).
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they] could not deny homeless populations shelter on the one hand and
criminalize the only alternative they had—sleeping in the street and in
public places—on the other.”45 The Jones case was brought by six
unhoused individuals who had been arrested for violating what the court
described as “one of the most restrictive municipal laws regulating public
spaces in the United States” at the time.46 The ordinance stated that “[n]o
person shall sit, lie or sleep in or upon any street, sidewalk or other public
way.”47
In district court, the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction
prohibiting enforcement of the ordinance between the hours of 9:00 p.m.
and 6:30 a.m.48 They argued that due to the extreme breadth of the
ordinance, allowing enforcement “twenty-four hours a day against persons
with nowhere else to sit, lie, or sleep, other than on public streets and
sidewalks” constituted criminalization of status as homeless individuals in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.49
The district court disagreed, concluding that the ordinance simply
penalized the conduct specified and therefore did not violate the Eighth
Amendment.50 This determination was grounded in the bench’s general
reluctance to recognize homelessness as a constitutionally cognizable
status by relying heavily on Joyce v. City & County of San Francisco, in
which a similar argument was rejected.51 The court in Joyce reasoned that
Court[s] must approach with hesitation any argument that science or
statistics compels a conclusion that a certain condition be defined as
a status. The Supreme Court has determined that drug addiction
equals a status, and this Court is so bound. But the Supreme Court
has not made such a determination with respect to homelessness, and
because that situation is not directly analogous to drug addiction, it
would be an untoward excursion by this Court into matters of social
policy to accord to homelessness the protection of status.52

Thus, the importance of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Jones can only
be truly understood in light of this historical judicial prudence in homeless
rights litigation.

45. Annie Lai, Confronting Proxy Criminalization, 92 DENV. U.L. REV. 879, 900 (2015).
46. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006
(9th Cir. 2007).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1125.
51. Id.
52. Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F.Supp. 843, 858 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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By reversing the district court and remanding the issue back with
instruction to grant appropriate injunctive relief,53 the Ninth Circuit was
forced to justify its decision in an incongruous precedential environment.
To accomplish this, the court grounded its analysis in the U.S. Supreme
Court cases establishing addiction as a constitutionally recognized status
under the Eighth Amendment: Robinson v. California54 and its progeny.55
A task easier said than done, given the fact that “[t]he Court did not
articulate the principles that undergird its holding [in Robinson],”56 which
led to a fractured decision delivered by the Court in Powell v. Texas
subsequently testing the addiction-as-status doctrine.57
In Powell, an Eighth Amendment challenge was brought by a chronic
alcoholic convicted under an ordinance prohibiting public drunkenness.58
The Powell Court’s 4-1-4 split centered on whether Robinson stood for the
proposition that criminalizing conduct that was involuntarily incidental to
a cognizable status was precluded by the Eighth Amendment.59 Four
members of the 4-1 plurality in Powell concluded that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited only regulations that facially penalized status and
did not apply because the State was free to regulate socially unacceptable
conduct.60
To reach its decision, the Jones court had to combine the four-justice
dissent from Powell with the concurrence of the single justice that refused
to join the plurality’s opinion despite agreeing with its result.61 This bit of
judicial gymnastics allowed the Jones court to find that a five-member
majority of the Court in Powell actually agreed that the correct
construction of the rule from Robinson is “that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the state from punishing an involuntary act or condition if it is
the unavoidable consequence of one’s status or being.”62
The Jones court’s willingness to flex its analytical muscle to square
the Eighth Amendment jurisprudential circle left by the Robinson and
Powell decisions clearly signals that the court may be willing to intervene
on the behalf of unjustly penalized individuals experiencing homelessness.
Nonetheless, the court also took great pains to ensure that its opinion was
53. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1138.
54. See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
55. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1131 (“The district court erred by not engaging in a more thorough
analysis of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence under Robinson v. California and Powell v. Texas.”)
(internal citations omitted).
56. Id. at 1133.
57. See generally Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
58. Id. at 517.
59. See generally id.
60. See generally id.
61. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1135.
62. Id.
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highly restrained. In its conclusion, the court prudentially hedged its
opinion, stating:
We do not suggest that Los Angeles adopt any particular social
policy, plan, or law to care for the homeless. We do not desire to
encroach on the legislative and executive functions reserved to the
City Council and the Mayor of Los Angeles. There is obviously a
“homeless problem” in the City of Los Angeles, which the City is
free to address in any way that it sees fit, consistent with the
constitutional principles we have articulated. By our decision, we in
no way dictate to the City that it must provide sufficient shelter for
the homeless, or allow anyone who wishes to sit, lie, or sleep on the
streets of Los Angeles at any time and at any place within the City.
All we hold is that, so long as there is a greater number of homeless
individuals in Los Angeles than the number of available beds, the
City may not enforce section 41.18(d) at all times and places
throughout the City against homeless individuals for involuntarily
sitting, lying, and sleeping in public. Appellants are entitled at a
minimum to a narrowly tailored injunction against the City’s
enforcement of section 41.18(d) at certain times and/or places.63

Additionally, the opinion itself was subsequently vacated upon
notice that the parties had settled the case and jointly agreed to dismiss
their appeal.64
That said, the analytical force and persuasive value of the Jones
court’s construction of Eighth Amendment doctrine cannot be ignored. In
fact, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a statement of interest in a
subsequent similar case out of Idaho and clarified that it understood the
correct construction of the Eighth Amendment to be the rule announced in
Jones.65
B. Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles
Desertrain involved a challenge to another Los Angeles municipal
ordinance. This ordinance made it a crime for anyone to utilize a vehicle
for habitation on public property for more than one consecutive night
anywhere within the city.66 The challenge was brought by multiple
63. Id. at 1138 (citations omitted).
64. See Jones, 505 F.3d at 1006.
65. Statement of Interest of the United States at 4, Bell v. Boise, 834 F.Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Idaho
Aug. 6, 2015) (No. 1:09–cv–00540–REB) (“[T]he United States files this Statement of Interest to
make clear that the Jones framework is the appropriate legal framework for analyzing Plaintiffs’
Eighth Amendment claims.”) rev’d and remanded, 709 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2013), partial summary
judgement granted, 993 F.Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Idaho 2015), dismissed for lack of standing, sub nom.
Martin v. Boise, No. 1:09–cv–00540–REB, 2015 WL 5708586 (D. Idaho 2015), appeal filed, Martin
v. Boise, No. 15-35845 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2015).
66. Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 2014).
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plaintiffs who were arrested for violating the ordinance after the City
began aggressively enforcing it in late 2010.67 Several constitutional
claims were raised to challenge the ordinance, but the lower court granted
the City summary judgment and refused to hear the plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment vagueness claim because it was not raised in the first
amended complaint.68 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit not only found that the
lower court’s refusal to hear the vagueness claim was an abuse of
discretion but further held that the ordinance was void because it both
failed “to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to
understand what conduct it prohibits” and “encourage[d] arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.”69
The Desertrain opinion is an example of both judicial
interventionism and prudential caution by the Ninth Circuit in addressing
constitutional attacks to municipal legislation alleged to unfairly
criminalize homelessness. By linking its opinion to past judicial efforts to
deal with perceived legislative and executive injustices through the
application—and to some degree, the contortion—of vagueness doctrine,70
the court highlights its growing impatience with the continued
criminalization of poverty and homelessness.
The Desertrain court signals its interventionist intent in two primary
ways. First, the court’s forceful language in concluding the opinion clearly
indicates the interventionist principles underlying the decision. The court
not only directly acknowledges the unique challenges that many vehicle
residents face; it also sends a strong message to municipal legislators when
it declares that “[the city] has many options at its disposal to alleviate the
plight and suffering of its homeless citizens . . . [but s]electively
preventing the homeless and the poor from using their vehicles for
[otherwise legal] activities . . . should not be one of those options.”71
Second, the court’s decision to review the Fourteenth Amendment
vagueness claim on the merits to void the ordinance indicates the court’s
waning tolerance of municipal legislation that targets and penalizes people
experiencing poverty. The court’s waning tolerance can be seen in the
grounding of its opinion in two historically significant Fourteenth
Amendment cases.
The court references the first of these two landmark cases in finding
that the ordinance did not provide adequate notice to the public by
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1153.
69. Id. at 1155–57.
70. Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v. Morales: The Intersection
of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal Law, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101,
102 (2002).
71. Desertrain, 754 F.3d at 1157–58.
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analogizing to City of Chicago v. Morales, where the Supreme Court
struck down a controversial anti-gang loitering prohibition.72 The Morales
decision has been criticized as having “stretched vagueness doctrine nearly
to its logical breaking point.”73 Nonetheless, the Morales Court’s opinion
seemed to “harken[] back to [its] legendary effort to deal with obscenity:
as with obscenity laws, the Court in effect indicated it could not define
what constituted an unconstitutional anti-gang ordinance, but it knew one
when it saw one.”74
In its second historically significant case reference, the Desertrain
court based its arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement decision on
possibly the most famous of all vagueness doctrine cases, Papachristou v.
Jacksonville.75 The court in fact states directly that the Los Angeles
ordinance “raises the same concerns of discriminatory enforcement . . . [as
the historically racist] city ordinance prohibiting vagrancy” struck down
in Papachristou.76
Despite this strong signaling by the court, the Desertrain opinion is
still quite prudentially restrained. This prudential restraint is seen in the
court’s choice not to address the merits of any of the other potential
constitutional issues raised on appeal. By choosing to address the
dispositive vagueness question, having to overrule a lower court
procedural decision in order to do it,77 and cleanly resolving the presented
controversy, the court was able to avoid addressing the potentially
thornier—and the potentially more impactful, from a homeless rights
advocacy perspective—constitutional questions regarding whether the
Fourteenth Amendment right to travel and Fourth Amendment search and
seizure doctrines provide viable claims to protect the rights of people
experiencing homelessness.78
III. A DEEPER DIVE INTO THE HOMESTEAD ACT
All of the potential interventionist signaling in the world would be of
no avail in this instance, though, if the act under which the novel statutory
claim is raised is not amenable to an interpretation necessary for the court
72. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999).
73. Strosnider, supra note 70.
74. Id.
75. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972); see Risa Goluboff, The
Forgotten Law That Gave Police Nearly Unlimited Power, TIME: HISTORY (Feb. 1, 2016), http://time.
com/4199924/vagrancy-law-history/ [https://perma.cc/5AZD-BYKK] (discussing the historical
significance of Papchristou in limiting the spread and impact of vagrancy laws); see also Melissa J.
Gismondi, Backstory’s Top 5 Trials of the Century, BACKSTORY: BLOG (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.
backstoryradio.org/blog/backstorys-top-5-trials-of-the-century/ [https://perma.cc/VLP4-UE53].
76. Desertrain, 754 F.3d at 1156 (internal quotations omitted).
77. Id. at 1154–55.
78. Id. at 1153 n.2.
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to reach a favorable decision. Fortunately, from a textual analytical
approach, Washington’s Homestead Act appears to be ripe for just such
an interpretation. Additionally, the underlying policies that have
historically animated application and expansion of the Act’s exemptions
further encourage an interventionist interpretation.
One of the key reasons that the Homestead Act is an excellent
candidate for an interventionist reading is because its language speaks in
an exceptionally clear, unambiguous, and declarative manner. The
operative language of the Act is codified generally in RCW chapter 6.13.
Of significance, RCW § 6.13.010 defines a homestead as simply “real or
personal property that the owner uses as a residence,”79 which would
include a vehicle resident’s personal vehicle. The only relevant limitation
expressed in the statute is that the owner of the property must intend to
utilize the property as their principal residence.80 Once this definitional
requirement is met, the Act is equally clear about its application of an
automatic exemption from any form of forced sale to satisfy a judgement.81
In fact, the Act expressly requires that a claimed homestead be presumed
valid unless its validity is successfully contested in court.82
In addition to these unambiguous mandates, the Act has historically
been construed liberally and given broad effect.83 In fact, from a public
policy perspective, homestead exemptions have been described as
necessary “to prevent the weak from being overpowered by the strong.”84
This combination of unambiguous mandate and liberal construction sets
up a perfect playfield for judicial activism.
However, even from this seemingly favorable statutory background,
asserting homestead rights to protect a vehicle from authorized
extrajudicial impoundment presents a few thorny questions that could
allow a prudentially inclined bench to avoid the type of judicial
intervention being sought. One obstacle, a potential interpretative conflict
between the operative statutes, also appears to be the easiest to overcome.
79. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.13.010 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (emphasis
added).
80. Id.
81. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.13.040 (“A homestead [] is automatically protected by the
exemption . . . from and after the time the personal property is occupied as a principal residence by
the owner.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.13.070 (“[T]he homestead is exempt from attachment and
from execution or forced sale for the debts of the owner up to the amount specified.”). The term “forced
sale” is never expressly defined in the statute.
82. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.13.070.
83. See Lien v. Hoffman, 306 P.2d 240, 244–45 (Wash. 1957) (“Homestead and exemption
statutes are favored in the law and should be liberally construed.”); First Nat’l Bank of Everett v.
Tiffany, 242 P.2d 169, 173 (Wash. 1952) (“As a matter of public policy, homestead and exemption
laws are to secure and protect the homesteader . . . . They do not protect the rights of creditors.”).
84. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 237 (2d
ed. 2013).
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As addressed, the Homestead Act speaks directly to the question of
whether homestead status should extend to a vehicle being used as a
primary residence.85 The question then becomes whether the operative
impoundment statute can be interpreted as authorizing a “forced sale to
satisfy a judgement” from which the vehicle would be exempted as a
homestead.
From a purely textual analysis of the governing statute, the answer
would presumably be yes. The statutory chapter governing the operations
of authorized impoundments states that a “registered tow truck operator
who has a valid and signed impoundment authorization has a lien upon the
impounded vehicle for services provided in the towing and storage of the
vehicle.”86 That is to say that the operator’s lien attaches immediately upon
valid authorization of impoundment. Additionally, the same statute grants
the operator an immediate “deficiency claim against the registered owner
of the vehicle for services provided in the towing and storage of the
vehicle.”87 In executing this deficiency claim, the operator is authorized to
sell the vehicle at auction to satisfy the debt incurred by the registered
owner.88 On the face of these provisions, it would appear extremely
difficult to argue that this is not the exact type of “attachment and []
execution or forced sale for the debts of the owner” upon which the
homestead exemption is supposed to operate.89
Nonetheless, there are three additional lines of prudential arguments
that could complicate what seems like a straight forward application of the
Homestead Act’s protections in a case such as Long: (1) that the
Homestead Act should not act as a procedural bar to the execution of an
authorized impoundment; (2) that the type of lien that is authorized by the
impoundment ordinance is included in the list of statutory exceptions to
the Act’s protections; and (3) that the Act’s protections might be
fraudulently invoked to avoid otherwise valid exercises of routine police
activity.
A. The Homestead Act as a Procedural Bar to Impoundment
The first argument questions the procedural timing of the assertion
of the exemption. Ideally, the most far reaching and impactful result from
a homeless rights interventionist perspective would be a holding that
would allow the assertion of the homestead exemption as a categorical bar
85. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.13.010 (“The homestead consists of real or personal property
that the owner uses as a residence.”).
86. Id. § 46.55.140.
87. Id.
88. Id. § 46.55.130.
89. Id. § 6.13.070.
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to any authorization of an impoundment, whether valid or otherwise. That
is to say, a holding that would allow a vehicle resident who has been
notified of a violation that might otherwise result in the eventual
impoundment of the vehicle (such as a violation of Seattle’s ordinance
requiring a vehicle to move at least one block every seventy-two hours)90
to inform the enforcement authority (e.g., the Seattle Police Department)
of the vehicle’s homestead status to bar authorization of impoundment.
While it is unclear if the court’s holding in the Long appeal goes this far,
such a holding’s vulnerability in a future challenge would be two-fold.
On one hand, there is concern that the ideal outcome would not
actually be practical in operation. A reviewing court could find that an
attachment or forced sale as contemplated by the Homestead Act is not
implicated until after the actual removal of the vehicle as authorized by
the city for violation of a public health and safety law.91 On another hand,
because the registered owner has recourse after the removal of the vehicle
to challenge the validity of any impoundment action,92 a more prudential
reading of the statutes would indicate that the appropriate time to raise the
homestead objection would be at an impoundment validity hearing.
Either of these potentially more prudential interpretations run
expressly counter to not only a textual reading of the relevant Homestead
Act provisions but also to the spirit of the law as historically applied. As
previously discussed, courts have construed the Act liberally and given it
broad effect.93 The Homestead Act unambiguously states that homestead
status attaches automatically to any personal property that is utilized as a
person’s primary place of residence.94 Thus, the Act’s protections are
invoked immediately upon authorization of impoundment of an otherwise
eligible vehicle. Additionally, any argument that subordinates the Act’s
exemption to employment only at an impoundment validation hearing
would be contrary to the direct textual application of the governing statute.
The Act is equally clear that homestead status is “presumed to be valid to
the extent of all the property claimed exempt, until the validity thereof is
contested in a court of general jurisdiction.”95 From a plain-language
90. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.72.440(B) (2018).
91. See id. § 11.10.040 (“This subtitle is enacted as an exercise of the police power of the City
to protect and preserve the public peace, health, safety and welfare, and its provisions shall be liberally
construed for the accomplishment of these purposes.”). Contra Amended Decision, supra note 30, at
10.
92. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.55.120 (2018).
93. See Lien v. Hoffman, 306 P.2d 240, 244–45 (Wash. 1957) (“Homestead and exemption
statutes are favored in the law and should be liberally construed.”); First Nat’l Bank of Everett v.
Tiffany, 242 P.2d 169, 173 (Wash. 1952) (“As a matter of public policy, homestead and exemption
laws are to secure and protect the homesteader . . . . They do not protect the rights of creditors.”).
94. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.13.040.
95. Id. § 6.13.070.
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interpretation of the statute, once a homestead exemption has been raised,
the exemption is presumed valid and the burden falls on the enforcement
agency to defeat the exemption in court in order to authorize any form of
attachment, not the other way around.96 Thus, any attempted interpretation
by a court that a homestead exemption would operate only as a means of
invalidating the otherwise valid impoundment of a vehicle, after the
impoundment and lien attachment had already occurred, is specifically
violative of the express language of the homestead statutes.
B. The List of Exceptions in the Homestead Acts
The second line of prudential reasoning that could potentially limit
the prospective scope of the Long appeal’s holding argues that a reviewing
court should read the tow truck operator’s lien into the list of exceptions
to the application of the homestead exemption included in the Act.
Specifically, the Act states that the homestead status cannot be invoked to
protect against “debts secured by mechanic’s, laborer’s, construction,
maritime, automobile repair, material supplier’s, or vendor’s liens.”97 A
prudentially-minded bench might choose to interpret the stated class of,
for example, “vendor’s liens,” as ambiguous enough to include the type of
lien contemplated by RCW § 46.55.140,98 applying the maxim of noscitur
a sociis.99
Arguably, the specific type of lien granted to the operator in
RCW § 46.55.140, is a garageman’s lien.100 Thus, a more favorable
construction of RCW § 6.13.080, from an interventionist perspective,
would be to apply the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius101 to
the list of excluded liens. If the legislature was intentionally specific when
96. Id.
97. Id. § 6.13.080.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Burns v. City of Seattle, 164 P.3d 475, 485 (Wash. 2007) (stating “a doubtful term
or phrase in a statute or ordinance takes its meaning from associated words and phrases”); City of
Mercer Island v. Kaltenbach, 371 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Wash. 1962) (“That a term in a statute or ordinance
takes its meaning from the context in which it is employed is so well accepted that citation of authority
is unnecessary[.]”).
100. See generally David Harrison, Lien for Towing or Storage, Ordered by Public Officer, of
More Vehicle, 85 A.L.R.3d 199 (2011) (defining the lien authorized for the towing or storage of a
motor vehicle, ordered by a public officer, as a garageman’s lien); Marjorie Dick Rombauer, Tow
Truck Operator’s Lien on Impounded Vehicle, 27 WASH. PRAC. § 4.177 (2017) (discussing the
specifics of the tow truck operator’s lien on impounded vehicle as a separate class of liens).
101. In re Cunningham, 163 B.R. 593, 595 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1994) (“If the legislature wishes
to create additional exceptions to the homestead exemption, it must do so clearly and specifically by
adding them to the statute’s list of exceptions.”). See also In re Killian v. Seattle Pub. Sch., 403 P.3d
58, 65 (Wash. 2017) (“When the legislature expresses one thing in a statute, we infer that omissions
are exclusions.”); Det. of Williams, 55 P.3d 597, 604 (Wash. 2002) (“Under expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, a canon of statutory construction, to express one thing in a statute implies the
exclusion of the other.”).
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it crafted the list of equitable liens that would warrant exception from the
application of the Homestead Act, then it was similarly intentional in
deciding not to include a garageman’s lien in the list. This interpretation
is in line with the legislature’s intent that the Act’s protections be given a
very liberal construction.102 Thus, because this type of garageman’s lien,
granted to tow truck operators by the impoundment statute,103 is not
specifically listed among the types of liens exempted by the Homestead
Act—“mechanic’s, laborer’s, construction, maritime, automobile repair,
material supplier’s, or vendor’s liens”104—then it is not an exception to the
homestead exemption.
C. The Potential for Misuse of the Homestead Exemption
The last bit of prudential reasoning that a reviewing court might fall
back on in refusing to interpret the Long holding as allowing the
homestead exemption to bar police from enforcing all impoundment
ordinances would be a general concern for the potential misuse of such
exemptions by people not actually experiencing homelessness. This fear
could lead a reviewing court to decide that the Homestead Act was never
meant to operate as a bar to routine police activity.
But even this potential line of reasoning fails in the face of the plain
text and historical application of homestead exemptions in Washington.
The statute itself contemplates the possibility of fraudulent claims of
homestead protection by those not actually residing in the property.105 That
said, it also clearly shifts the burden of disproving the validity of the
homestead exemption away from the property owner raising it.106
There does, though, appear to be some contention in the courts
regarding the procedural effect of this burden shifting.107 Most of the cases
testing this procedural scheme arise in the form of interlocutory objections
to execution of liens granted prior to the declaration of homestead in a
bankruptcy action,108 but the factual scenario in the case of an extrajudicial
impoundment authorization is completely different. In this case, the
question is how the automatic attachment of homestead status
contemplated by the Act operates in the face of the extrajudicial
102. See Lien v. Hoffman, 306 P.2d 240, 244–45 (Wash. 1957).
103. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.55.140 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.).
104. Id. § 6.13.080.
105. Id. § 6.13.010 (“Property included in the homestead must be actually intended or used as
the principal home for the owner.”); Webster v. Rodrick, 394 P.2d 689, 692 (Wash. 1964) (“The
homestead exemption statute cannot be used as an instrument of fraud and imposition.”).
106. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.13.070 (“Every homestead created under this chapter is
presumed to be valid . . . until the validity thereof is contested in a court of general jurisdiction.”).
107. See generally Traverso v. Cerini, 263 P. 184, 185–86 (Wash. 1928).
108. Id. at 184–85; see also Enyart v. Humble, 562 P.2d 648, 649 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977).
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attachment of a lien authorized by the combination of a municipal
ordinance and a state statute. An interventionist court could seize on the
strong language used by past courts regarding the policies underpinning
the Homestead Act to conclude that in such cases the Act operates to
protect the property owner at the point of lien attachment.109
Additionally, it is not as if the local police (who are being asked to
enforce these extrajudicial impoundment ordinances) are incapable of
deciphering between a vehicle being used for habitation from those
impermissibly parked for other reasons.110 Many of these same
enforcement officials feel “caught inbetween [sic] the rock-and-hard-place
of trying to enforce rules without harming vulnerable populations.”111 By
allowing them to presume the validity of a homestead exemption112 when
they encounter a vehicle resident who otherwise might be in violation of
the seventy-two hour time limit, they would have a harm-reducing option
that they currently lack. Thus, the clash of policy concerns that such an
interpretation might engender—the poorly defensible public health and
safety concerns supposedly addressed by the impoundment ordinances
versus the forcefully articulated and historically grounded protection of
homestead rights intended “to prevent the weak from being overpowered
by the strong”113—can hardly be defended as a rationale against the Long
appeal’s holding.
CONCLUSION
Washington’s Homestead Act is the perfect vehicle, no pun intended,
for judicial intervention in Washington courts to protect vehicle residents
from the harms of criminalizing a life-sustaining activity—utilizing their
vehicle as a primary means of shelter. Unlike the judicial activism you see
in cases like Jones and Desertrain, the intervention being advocated for
here, as seen in the Long appeal’s Homestead Act holding, is necessarily
already constrained by the fact that it entails interpretation of local laws
rather than the expansion of federal constitutional law. Also, the holding
is limited in scope by attaching only to vehicles being utilized as a primary
form of residence. That said, its potential impact as a signal to state and
local lawmakers cannot be overstated. The Long court’s interpretation of
the Homestead Act could force both municipal and state lawmakers to
109. Webster, 394 P.2d at 691 (“The homestead exemption must be used as a shield to protect
the homesteader and his dependents in the enjoyment of a domicile.”); UTTER, supra note 84
(describing the historical understanding of the Homestead Act as necessary “to prevent the weak from
being overpowered by the strong”).
110. See Hidalgo, supra note 19.
111. Id.
112. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.13.070 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.).
113. UTTER, supra note 84.
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reconsider the use of punitive ordinances and statues as a means of
addressing the “homelessness problem,” at least as it relates to vehicle
residency.114 Of course, the full implications of Long’s holding and the
Homestead Act’s viability as a pressure release valve for vehicle residents
are yet to be realized. As the case makes its way through the appeals
process, vehicle residents, both in Seattle and across the state, will be
watching and waiting to see if the Washington courts continue the tradition
of construing the Homestead Act liberally to protect the vulnerable from
the powerful—to protect their homes.

114. See Martin Cizmar, This Seattle Man Won the Constitutional Right to Live in His Truck—
It Could Be the Start of a Revolution in How We Handle the Homeless, RAWSTORY (May 10, 2018),
https://www.rawstory.com/2018/05/seattle-man-won-constitutional-right-live-truck-start-revolutionhandle-homeless/ [https://perma.cc/K887-NVFD].

